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adopted it including the state of New York. When such a respected
pioneer in the area of state taxation radically alters its own law
this poses a compelling reason for other jurisdictions to re-analyze their
present positions.
Anthony N. DeLuccia Jr.

CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-MAIN PURPOSE DocrRINE-ADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION-WHEN THE PROMISOR ASSUMES PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY AND HIS LEADING OBJECT

Is To

SERVE SOME INTER-

EST OR PURPOSE OF His OWN, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EFFECT Is To
PAY OR DISCHARGE THE DEBT OF ANOTHER, THE ORAL PROMISE IS

Haas Drilling Company v.
First National Bank in Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The plaintiff, Haas Drilling Co., filed this action against the defendant, First National Bank in Dallas, alleging that the defendant had
breached an alleged oral promise to answer for, assume, and to pay as
its own debt, the account of another, B&B Gas Petroleum, Inc. Haas
was a supplier of jetting gas to B&cB Gas Petroleum, Inc. The purpose
of the jetting gas was to keep the well from sanding up. B&B had a
number of oil leases, the Cantu lease being mortgaged to the defendant.
B&cB encountered problems in its drilling operation and fell into default on certain mortgage payments to the Bank. Furthermore, a number of notes had been executed in favor of Haas for jetting gas that
had been furnished to B&B. In January 1966 the Bank took control
of the B&cB leases, including the lease on which Haas held the notes.
Haas notified the Bank concerning the outstanding debts of B&B and
stated that he could no longer supply jetting gas unless the debt was
paid in full. The Bank, realizing that if the gas was shut off all secondary operations would be lost, orally promised the plaintiff that they
would take care of the outstanding debts of B&B, after the foreclosure
sale was held on the mortgaged leases. After the sale the officer of the
Bank that allegedly made the promise for the Bank, denied making
such promise. This suit was brought to enforce that oral promise. The
Bank filed an answer containing both special and general denials, and
plead the statute of frauds. The jury in the trial court gave judgment
for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court.' Held-Reversed, judgment of the trial court is reinstated. When the promisor assumes primary responsibility and his
leading object is to serve some interest or purpose of his own, notwith1 First Nat. Bank in Dallas v. Haas Drilling Co., 446 S.W.2d 29 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1969, writ granted).
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standing the effect is to pay or discharge the debt of another, the oral
promise is not within the statute of frauds.
The law of Contracts as it was adopted in the United States, contained many areas where injustice, not justice, was the dominant theme.
One form of injustice occurred where a promisee could be held liable
to pay the debt of another when the sole supporting evidence of the
oral promise was the honesty of the promisor.2 To remove this injustice the Statute of Frauds was enacted by the Texas Legislature.3 With
the advent of the Statute of Frauds, however, it became clear that the
statute while removing one injustice, made it possible for another to
occur. Under the statute one party could orally promise to answer for
the debt of another and at his option refuse to perform. With these
possibilities in view, the ground work had been laid for the enactment
of the "main purpose" or "leading object" rule.
The "main purpose" or "leading object" doctrine was mentioned
initially in Lemmon v. Box, 4 in 1857. This decision of the Supreme

Court of Texas seemed to establish the "main purpose" doctrine as a
guiding force in future Texas decisions. However, in Housley v. Strawn
Merchandise Co., 5 decided by the Texas Commission of Appeals in
1927, the court ascribed a different meaning to the "main purpose"
rule. The court stated:
It means that, if the character of the promise is such that it creates
an obligation independent of the obligation of the other party,
and is therefore an original and not a collateral undertaking, it is
not within the contemplation of the statute, even though the promise may be in form one to pay the debt of another. If the promise
is, in substance, an undertaking to pay the debt of another, it is
within the statute, regardless of the purpose for which it was
made.6 (Emphasis added.)
The Housley court went further and attempted to clear from the legal
corridors the "main purpose" rule when it stated:
No useful purpose would here be served in discussing the rule,
which has been adopted by courts of some other states to deter2 Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 487, 12 S. Ct. 58, 59, 35 L. Ed. 826, 828 (1891), where
the United States Supreme Court stated: "The purpose of this provision was not to
effectuate, but to prevent, wrong. . . . The reason of the statute is obvious, for in the
one case if there be any conflict between the parties as to the exact terms of the promise,
the courts can see that justice is done by charging against the promisor the reasonable
value of that in respect to which the promise was made, while in the other case, and
when a third party is the real debtor, and the party alone receiving benefit, it is impossible to solve the conflict of memory or testimony in any manner certain to accomplish
justice."
3 Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (1968).
4 20 Tex. 329 (1857).
5 291 S.W. 864 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, holding approved).
6 Id. at 867.
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mine whether an oral promise to pay the debt of another was
within the statute of frauds enacted by those states, termed the
"main purpose rule." This rule is not applied in this state. A promin writing, does not have the
ise to pay the debt of another, if not
7
effect to create a legal obligation.
If the intention of the Housley court was to overrule Lemmon v. Box,8
their findings were disregarded by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in
Brown v. Majors,9 where the court in considering an oral promise of
one party to answer for the debt of another, stated:
The applicable rule is that whenever the main object is not to
answer for another's debt, but to subserve one's own purpose, the
promise is not within the statute of frauds, although in form it
is a promise to pay another's debt and incidentally has that effect.' 0
In viewing the Housley, Brown, and Lemmon, cases, lawyers in Texas
were faced with uncertainty regarding the "main purpose" rule. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas in Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v.
Titus," attempted to clarify the court's position concerning the "main
purpose" rule:
Whether therefore we regard the statement in the Housley case as
dictum, or whether we consider it to be out of line with Lemmon
v. Box, ... ,and the more recent opinions of the Court of Civil
Appeals, we here hold that the "leading object" or "main purpose"
in Lemmon v. Box should and does apply in
doctrine announced
2
this state.1
One of the major problems that courts have encountered in attempting to apply the "main purpose" rule has been the term sufficient consideration.'3 Where one party is attempting to invoke the jurisdiction
and effect of the "main purpose" rule, something more than consideration per se has been deemed necessary.. 4 The consideration must be
7 Id.

820 Tex. 329 (1857).
9 251 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ).
10 Id. at 789.

11163 Tex. 260, 354 S.W.2d 378 (1962).
12 Id. at 273, 354 S.W.2d at 386.
13 Haas Drilling Co. v. First National Bank in Dallas, 456 8.W.2d 886 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
14 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 367 (1950). See also: WILLISTON, CONTRACTs, § 470 (Jaeger, 3d
ed. 1960).
But the distinction thus suggested is easily subject to misapprehension. The purpose
or object of the promisor is always to acquire the consideration for which the promise
is exchanged; that is why he gives his promise, not because his promise itself has a
purpose; and if he wants the consideration enough, he will give the kind -of promise
for it that the promisee desires. Therefore, it is perfectly possible for a promisor to
have as his leading purpose the 'gaining of some advantage' or 'promotion of some
interest of his own' by becoming 'a mere guarantor or surety of another's debt'.
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direct and the primary reason behind the promisor's promise. 15 Professor Corbin has stated:
It should be noted in the beginning that a
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the
tracts without being sufficient to satisfy the
and take the promise out of the Statute of
there
not
it.16 out of the statute merely because

consideration may be
common law of con"leading object" rule
Frauds. A promise is
is a consideration for

Professor Corbin went further in defining sufficient consideration:
The statute is applicable to promises to answer for the debt of
another for which there is some sufficient consideration. It appears,
however, that certain kinds of consideration will prevent a promand will
ise from being one "to answer for the debt of another"
7
account.1
own
his
on
a
debtor
promisor
make the
The courts of Texas have from time to time taken it upon themselves to clarify consideration, in light of the "main purpose" rule. In
Faver v. Leonard the court stated:
The promise made by Obadiah Callaway being a promise within
the Statute of Frauds, and the consideration therefor, the hauling
of the gravel by plaintiff, in an ordinary case would be a sufficient
consideration; however, in a case involving the statute of frauds
said consideration is not sufficient as there is no new and independent considerationflowing to Obadiah Callaway. "In order to take
his promise out of the statute, he must be bargaining for a consideration that is beneficial to himself and that constitutes his primary objection of desire. So the court holds that where there is
a new and independent benefit or detriment to the promisor, then
the statute of frauds is no defense; but where there is no new and
independent benefit or detriment, the promise is unenforceable
as a violation of the statute of frauds."' 8 (Emphasis added.)
The court was evidently of the opinion that since Obadiah Callaway
had no interest in the land, he could not derive any new and independent consideration for the promise and therefore, the "main purpose"
rule should not have been applied. What the court must have disregarded in this case was that although the foreman did not have any
title interest in the ranch, he still maintained an interest, i.e. he was
an employee of the ranch. As an employee, his further employment
could have well been conditioned on the continuing supply of sand
Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus, 163 Tex. 260, 354 S.W.2d 378 (1962).
18 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 367 (1950). See also Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus, 163
Tex. 260, 354 S.W.2d 378 (1962).
17 Id.
18 383 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, no writ).
15
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and gravel, and this should have been classified as sufficient consideration.
Applying this interpretation of the facts, the benefit the foreman
derived from his promise was both the direct and primary reason behind his making the promise. In Dallas Title & Guaranty Co. v. Jarrell, 9 the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant upon an alleged
breach of an oral promise. It appears that one party had ordered some
merchandise from the plaintiff and the defendant told the plaintiff
that they would pay the money at the time of the closing out of the
house. In reliance upon this, the plaintiff delivered the merchandise.
The court stated:
[..
[T]he kind of benefit that takes the promise out of the Statute
is one which the promisor receives or expects when he makes the
promise, resulting in an original, independent undertaking by the
promisor. The consideration for the promise must be a direct
benefit to the promisor and the primary object of making the
promise, as distinguished from a benefit which is merely incidental, indirect, or remote.20 (Emphasis added.)
Basing their decision on this reasoning, the court held that the promise
of the defendant created a new and independent obligation to pay the
debt of another; that there was sufficient consideration. 21 Therefore,
the defendant's promise was taken out of the Statute of Frauds. In the
more recent case of Womack v. Ballard Sales Company,22 the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant to settle an account between the
two parties. The defendant promised to pay the plaintiff a debt owed
by Charcoal, Inc. Upon trial, the defendant admitted making the
promise but he contended that there was an insufficiency of consideration in order to take the promise out of the Statute of Frauds. The
court replied:
The testimony that delivery of the merchandise was made in reliance on the guarantee, and that credit would not have been
extended to Charcoal, Inc., together with the fact that the merchandise was thereafter delivered, establishes
consideration for
28
the parol agreement to guarantee the debt.

The leading case in this area was Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v.

Titus.2 4 The plaintiff had filed a complaint against the defendant to

recover a debt that was owed by the partnership of which Titus was a
19 320 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, no writ).
at 700.

20 Id.
21 Id.

22411 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ).
23 Id. at 957.
24 163 Tex. 260, 354 S.W.2d 378 (1962).
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member and also on a debt that his partner had owed to the plaintiff,
for which Titus had orally promised to pay. The court of civil appeals
reversed a judgment of the trial court for the plaintiff on the basis that
the oral promise of Titus to pay the debt of another was unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff contended that Titus had
promised to pay the debt of his partner in order that the plaintiff
would continue to extend credit to the partnership. The trial court
had found that the promise of Titus had sufficient consideration, that
being the further extension of credit. If the plaintiff had refused to
continue the credit the partnership might have lost its crops. The Texas
Supreme Court stated:
Assuming as we have that he made the promise to obtain the credit,
the crucial point is that the consideration necessarily benefited
him as a member of the partnership because he shared in the partnership's ultimate profits, if any, and the benefit he received as a
member of the partnership
is considered sufficient to satisfy the
"main purpose" rule. 25
In Haas Drilling Co. v. FirstNational Bank in Dallas,26 the Supreme
Court of Texas held:
When the promisor assumes primary responsibility and his leading
object is to serve some interest or purpose of his own, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or discharge the debt of another, the
oral promise is not within the Statute of Frauds.
The main inquiry of the court in the instant case was whether the
promise of the officer of the bank was made with the view to become a
surety on the debt owed to Haas by B&B or if the intention of the bank
officer, acting for the bank, was to assume primary responsibility for
the debt of another. The court found that the promise made by the
officer of the bank was founded in the bank's desire to maintain and
to protect the well from sanding up, in order to protect the value of
the land.27 This desire of the bank was the direct benefit, i.e., the something more than consideration, that the court deemed necessary to
satisfy the "main purpose" rule.
Viewing the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Haas,28 in
light of the other decisions rendered by our courts that have dealt with
the issue of what constitutes sufficient consideration, the Court has
Id. at 273, 354 S.W.2d at 387.
456 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
Id.
Id. See also, Walker v. Lorehn, 355 S.W.2d 71 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil and Gas Co., 436 S.W.2d 889 (rex.
Sup. 1969), Seay v. Griffin, 308 S.W.2d 182 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1957, writ ref'd
25
26
27
28

n.r.e.), West Texas Production Cr. Ass'n. v. Harding Chemicals, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 950
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ refd n.r.e.).
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again failed to make it perfectly clear regarding the amount of consideration that is necessary to take the promise of one person to answer
for the debt of another out of the Statute of Frauds. In Faver v.
Leonard,29 the court held that the consideration must be "new" and
3 0 the court
"independent." In Dallas Title & Guaranty Co. v. Jarrell,
stated that "The considerationfor the promise must be a direct benefit
to the promisor and the primary object of making the promise, as distinguished from a benefit which is merely incidental, indirect or remote." (Emphasis added.) In Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus, 1
the court stated that ".

.

. the crucial point is that the consideration

necessarily benefited him as a member of the partnership because he
shared in the partnership's ultimate profits, if any.....
" Finally, in
Haas Drilling Co. v. First National Bank in Dallas,3 2 the court stated
that "When the promisor assumes primary responsibility and his leading object is to serve some interest or purpose of his own .....
"
(Emphasis added.) These statements clearly show the ambiguity that
surrounds the issue of what constitutes sufficient consideration to take
the promise of one to answer for the debt of another out of the Statute
of Frauds. Therefore, in any further application of the "main purpose"
rule, the courts of Texas should consider the following questions.
Should a qualitative or quantitative quotient be employed in deciding
whether there was sufficient consideration? Should the intention of one
who promises to pay the debt of another be considered, or should the
individual's words speak for themselves?
The purpose of law in our complex and often confusing society is to
promote and initiate justice between all segments of our society: the
rich and the poor, the seller and the buyer, and the intelligent and the
illiterate. Therefore, the courts of Texas must strive to promote the
ends of all judicial decisions, that being justice. With this goal in view,
the courts of Texas should attempt to establish more definite criteria as
to when a promise to answer for the debt of another is that of a surety
or that of a person who is assuming primary responsibility. One of the
shortcomings of the law today is its lack of definiteness. Courts must
play an instrumental part in trying to promulgate definite tests and
principles to broad generalities.
Alan Jay Rich
29 383
80 320
81 163
82 456

S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, no writ).
S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, no writ).
Tex. 260, 268, 354 S.W.2d 378, 387 (1962).
S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
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